Loss of scientific competence under the cover of proceduralism: the point at which fundamental knowledge is no longer required for peer review

This paper examines a specific case of peer review of a fundamental formal analysis devoted to the logical consistency of the concept of “sustainable development” within the framework of stability theory in the Lyapunov sense. The object of the study is not the substantive theses of the original work, but the texts of the review reports and the editor’s remark, treated as primary analytical material.

It is shown that the rejection of publication was not based on the identification of logical errors, incorrect definitions, or the invalidity of the formal inference. Instead, criteria relevant to empirical, applied, or normative studies were systematically applied to the fundamental logical-structural analysis. The analysis reveals a persistent reproduction of a category mistake consisting in conflating the assessment of conceptual coherence with the assessment of practical applicability and normative acceptability.

Special attention is given to the role of the editor’s remark as a mechanism of institutional amplification of this error, as a result of which the peer-review procedure demonstrates an ability to reproduce decisions without recourse to fundamental knowledge. The case under consideration is interpreted not as an isolated misunderstanding but as a symptom of a broader epistemic shift in which procedural correctness substitutes for disciplinary competence.